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Humans: correct in making leap from wealth as currency
to wealth as energy. But logic failure: wealth ultimately
is extension of desires, fluctuating with emotions and
state of mind. Desires: when all are supported in purely
adaptable system, true wealth is achieved.
1999 computer game ’Alien Crossfire’ (statement given
about humans by one of the game’s alien characters)
Abstract
Building on Mirowski’s historical analysis in the 1980s, the role of con-
servation laws in economic equilibrium theories is reexamined. Both static
Walrasian systems and dynamic systems of intertemporal optimization are
considered. While the formal derivation of conservation laws is discussed
in detail, the paper also reviews the growing literature tradition in eco-
nomics that is aware of the existence of conservation laws in economic
equilibrium theories and tries to incorporate them into their models.
1 Introduction
It has been almost 25 years since Mirowski (1989) published his seminal study
on the history of the energy-value analogy and of concepts from physics being
employed in economics in general. Mirowski discusses the history of the neoclas-
sical marginalist revolution as well as the contemporary development of both
physics and economics. He arrives at the conclusion that the analogies which
were explicitely drawn between the two by the proponents of the marginal-
ist revolution were mistaken.1 It requires unrealistic assumptions and implies
conclusions that are neither necessary nor useful. The problem was perhaps
aggravated when the analogy was almost forgotten by successive generations
of economists while the method subsequently became the unique and almost
unchallenged textbook-standard in economics - an arrangement that continues
today.
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1Mirowski’s (1989) analysis operates both on an mathematical analytical level and on the
history of though level. As shown by Hands (1993) some issues are actually more complex than
discussed in Mirowski (particularly that a conservative vector field like the ones in classical
mechanics is not formed by prices in general equilibrium models but rather by price-equivalents
resulting from compensated demand functions) but the general analysis holds.
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The one who made the analogy most explicit was probably Fisher (1892):
he compiled a table of what he believed to be analogous between physics and
economics. As Mirowski (1989) pointed out, many of these analogies were highly
questionable. Mirowski also noted the omission of other analogies that would
have logically followed from the stated ones, most notably the conservation law
and its presumable Walrasian economic equivalent, conjectured by Mirowski to
be the constancy of utility and expenditure. It is clear that this has no useful
economic interpretation while other alternative economic conservation laws do
at least come as additional constraints that the model may not violate but that
do not bestow additional benefit to the usability of the model.
Since, many works have been published about Mirowski’s study as well as
the relation between neoclassical economics and physics in general (De Marchi,
1993, Smith and Foley, 2008).
However, at the same time and without taking note of this line of research
a tradition of othodox economic literature has developed that is well aware of
the fact that the use of Lagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics in economics
implies economic conservation laws of some sort (Samuelson, 1970, 1990a,b,
Sato, 1981, 2006, Kataoka and Hashimoto, 1995). In fact, they derive and
interpret the conservation laws for a number of advanced economic models and
try to establish empirical evidence for their presence in real economic systems
(Sato, 2006). The models used in this tradition belong to the dynamic infinite
horizon optimization models as they are commonly used in the endogenous
growth theory.
The purpose of the current paper is to reconsider the case of conservation
laws in the Lagrangian and Hamiltonian systems used in both classical Wal-
rasian equilibrium theory 2 and in modern dynamic optimization models 3. The
derivation, implications, and literature will be discussed in these two sections
before the paper proceeds to offer a conclusion with a more general assessment
of the role of economic power laws 4.
2 Conservation Laws in Walrasian Equilibria
In classical mechanics, Lagrangians are constructed as dynamic equations of ki-
netic (T ) and potential energy (V ) in space for the purpose of deriving the move-
ment path of a particle. The space may or may not be constrained (by a con-
straint F ). While kinetic energy depends on space and the dynamic change(s) of
this (vector of) variable(s) ∂xi∂t = x˙i, hence T (xi, x˙i), potential energy depends
only on the position in space, hence V (xi).
2 The Lagrangian is constructed as
L(xi, x˙i, λ) = T (xi, x˙i)− V (xi)− λF (xi) (1)
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier.
Since the Lagrangian is not directly dependent on time t, a Hamiltonian can
be constructed as the Legendre transformation of the Lagrangian with respect
to the dynamic change variable(s) x˙i. The value of that Hamiltonian must be
constant over time and over all optimal paths which constitutes the law of the
conservation of energy. The Legendre transformation is an involutive transfro-
mation of a monotonic function f(x) of a variable x such that the transformation
2For details on the mathematical methodology, see Zia et al. (2009) or Arnol’d (1991).
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is a function fL(xL, x) = xLx− f(x) of xL = min(px− f(x)). Since it is involu-
tive the Legendre transformation of the function f returns the function f itself.





Consequently, the Hamiltonian corresponding to the above Lagrangian is






− L(xi, x˙i, λ) = const. (2)




∂T (xi, x˙i, λ)
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= 2T (xi, x˙i, thus
H = 2T − T + V + λF = T + V + λF = const.
which in unconstrained problems (i.e. without constraint F ) reduces to H =
T + V = const.
In 1892, Fisher (1892) had compiled a table of which concepts in economics
he thought te be equivalent to which concepts in classical mechanics. There,
he reiterated the alleged analogy of utility to energy or work. This appears to
be based on the assessment, that in classical mechanics, work is the product of
force and space, i.e. with the x being space and L = T (x) − V (x) being the
Lagrangian composed of kinetic (T ) and potential energy (V ) function, hence
force ∂L∂x , x
∂L
∂x . For economics, his table gives utility analogously to work or
force in physics as the product of commodity space and marginal utility, i.e.
with commodity space denoted by x and the utility function U(x), x∂U∂x . This
does, however, only hold if the marginal utility were constant in x (which is
usually not the case since utility functions are usually assumed to be concave)
and would otherwise conflict with the utility function U(x).
There has been some confusion about how to interpret the equivalent to
kinetic energy in Walrasian economic models. Mirowski (1989) conjectured it
to be expenditure so that the economic conservation law would require the sum
of utility and expenditure to be constant. However, the Walrasian economic op-
timization problem is not dynamic. Its Lagrangian is constructed from the said
utility function U(xi) (or equivalently shaped production function in production
theory) and a budget constraint F (xi) =
∑
i pixi−W ≤ 0 (where the pi are the
prices of goods or input factors i and W is the budget). Since the constraint
is linear, in order for the problem at hand to yield one unique optimum the
utility or production function has to be monotonically increasing, concave and
twice differentiable - which is a pretty strong assumption. Hence, we have a
Lagrangian
L(xi, λ) = U(xi)− λF (xi) (4)
and (as the Lagrangian does not directly depend on time t) the corresponding
Hamiltonian






− L(xi, λ) = const. (5)
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However, since the Lagrangian does also not depend on x˙, the sum in the first
term of the Hamiltonian is not the expenditure; instead it is always zero for
this kind of problems. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions require further λF (xi) to
be zero in equilibrium, thus we effectively obtain a conservation law of
H(xi) = −L(xi) = −U(xi) = const., (6)
i.e. for all optimum points the total utility is constant - a tautologically true
statement.
However, Walrasian optimization problems could also be constructed as dy-
namic problems, for instance, if the constraint were to depend on the change of
commodity quantities in time. Consider a situation where the utility does not
arise from the consumption of quantities xi of goods i but rather from posession
of those goods (say, real estate or luxury goods the agent has no practical use
for, i.e. which are only for display of wealth). In this case the agent pays only
her additional purchases of goods xi which may be negative if she sells some of
a particular good again, i.e. x˙i. She still has a constant stream of income of W .
The budget constraint is then F (x˙i) =
∑
i x˙ipi −W ≤ 0; the Lagrangian is
L(xi, λ) = U(xi)− λ(
∑
i



















For this, in turn, Mirowski’s proposition is (almost) true, since λ
∑
i x˙ipi is the
net expenditure, weighted with the constraint’s shadow price λ which allows
this monetary quantity to be transformed into a utility-like measure. The dif-
ference of this (summed up over the goods) and the utility must be constant
(over all points in time along the system’s development trajectory). Within
the assumptions of the theory and the particular budget function considered
here, this conservation law makes perfect sense; it serves as a condition for the
intertemporal optimum.
Given that some of the assumptions3 of the theory are, however, rather
heroic, the theory as a whole seems oddly fragile. The so derived conservation
law makes this all the more obvious.
3 Dynamic Conservation Laws in Economics
There is another class of neoclassical economic conservation laws. They are
a consequence of the theory of endogenous growth, so to speak the queen of
neoclassics that does not only define static situations but allows the derivation
of a dynamic optimal path and thus conclusions with respect to economic growth
and development. Endogenous growth models typically maximize a discounted
3The monotonically increasing, concave, twice differentiable utility function which suppos-
edly guides perfectly rational and (for free) well-informed agents who are willing and able to
constantly perform computations of infinite-dimensional optimization problems in order to
make decisions.
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intertemporal utility or income function (income often being written as the
growth of K˙) ∫
K˙dt (9)
subject to some intertemporal production function
F (K, K˙) = 0 (10)
that defines the limit of available capital. The function may be extended to two
or more capital variables of which all, some, or only one may be included into
the objective function: Limiting the discussion here to a model with the growth
of only one sort of capital in the target function4, say κ˙,∫
κ˙dt (11)
subject to
F (κ, κ˙,Ki, K˙i) = 0 (12)
the Lagrangian is obtained as
L(κ, κ˙,Ki, K˙i, λ) =
∫
κ˙− λtF (κ, κ˙,Ki, K˙i)dt. (13)
Applying the Legendre transformation, the Hamiltonian follows as5









































The right hand side of this last equation is usually interpreted as the total income





the heroic interpretation is made that they are, in fact, the prices of the
respective capital goods (Samuelson, 1970, Kataoka and Hashimoto, 1995). Note
that this says not much with respect to an intertemporal conservation laws since
λt can change over time. However, since λt depends on the rest of the system
of equations, its possible variation is limited and linked to the optimization
problem. For instance Samuelson (1970) - making the bold assumption that
λ(t) is continuous - used the Euler-Lagrange equation in the system’s optimum
4This is a relatively simple setup. The derivation of the conservation law roughly follows
Samuelson (1970, 1990a,b).
5Since L does not directly depend on t.
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path6 (i.e. with L = 0) to obtain an differential equation λ˙λ which he then
transforms into an exponential function by defining the right-hand side (with
additional assumptions) to be the growth rate of the price-weighted capital stock∑
i− ∂F∂K˙iKi −
∂F
∂κ˙ κ (’national wealth’). Having total income and the capital
stock so similarly defined (just one with K the other one with K˙) he proceeds
to show that the development of income is then governed by the same function
and that the ratio between the two must therefore be constant at all times (given
that the economy follows its equilibrium path).
More elaborate versions of such models by Sato (2006) and by Kataoka and
Hashimoto (1995) (those drawing on Sato (1981)) use Lie groups to derive the
invariance conditions that must be satisfied in order to obtain the conservation
law(s). Kataoka and Hashimoto (1995) arrive at the same conclusion as Samuel-
son (1970, 1990a,b) in a very different way. Here, the exponential depreciation
in the original present value target function is preserved in the conservation
law which results in both capital and income following the inverse of the expo-
nential depreciation (ert following the present value target function e−rt with
r being the factor of depreciation). That is, the main result of Samuelsons
1970 paper, the constant relation of income and capital, remains unchanged
in those theories, though this conjecture is derived in a different way and the
underlying model is completely different.7 It is obvious that the exponential
function is merely a convenient consequence of the way the time-preferences
are constructed - it resembles the exponential growth paths predicted by the
endogeous growth models of the time which were used to approximate the em-
pirical GDP development in the decades following World War II. With different
time prefecence terms, the shape of the function would change but the constant
ratio of income and capital would be preserved at least as long as the function
remains monotonic.
Consequently, the proponents of this theory tradition attempted to show that
this constancy of the income to capital ratio also holds empirically. Sato (2006),
for instance, finds roughly constant but different ratios for the pre-World War
II (0.23) and the post-World War II US economy (0.33) as well as mixed results
for other OECD countries. This is explained (particularly for the Japanese
case in which a continuing decline of the supposedly constant rate is found)
by suggesting that the environment of the optimization problem (prices, time-
preference factors, etc.) may not have been constant thus resulting in a shift of
the optimization problem. It is not unlikely that the ratios have recently - with
the ongoing financial crisis and recession - become more erratic. Further, for the
cases in which the ratio has indeed been constant for a prolonged period of time,
it might be prudent to also consider alternative explanations such as firm’s re-
investment behavior or expectations (perhaps even self-fulfilling expectations) in
economically calm times. This would not necessarily imply that intertemporal
neoclassical models and the conservation laws that follow from them are well-
founded.






for all i (for all input
factors) and equivalently for (output) κ. Differentiating the term λtF (κ, κ˙,Ki, K˙i) results




7In fact, Kataoka and Hashimoto (1995) derive two different conservation laws which do
however always include or may be transformed into this constant ratio.
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4 Conclusion: Can Economic Conservation
Laws be Preserved?
The two traditions of theory - Mirowski and critics of mechanical models and
conservation laws in economics on the one hand and those who try to derive and
interpret the conservation laws on the other hand - have so far mostly ignored
each other. The reevaluation of both traditions in the current paper suggests
that conservation laws in economic equilibrium models do generally have a useful
interpretation and fit well into the theory. In fact, they might offer additional
insight and make the general equilibrium theory easier to understand both as
such and in relation to similar models in classical mechanics.
The problems that remain are, of course, the assumptions on which the gen-
eral equilibrium theory rests and that have been sharply criticised by entire
traditions of economists starting with Sraffa (1926, 1960) and Young (1928) to
Kaldor (1972), institutionalists ((Ayres, 1935, Elsner, 2008)), and Keynesians
(Robinson, 1978) to evolutionary economists, (Nelson and Winter, 1974), eco-
logical economists (Georgescu-Roegen, 1975), and, more recently, complexity
economists (Kirman, 1997, Foley, 1998, Keen, 2001, Chen, 2010, Foley, 2010)
as well as many others. As these critics have continued to point out, there is no
evidence that either the aggregated (demand, supply, utility) functions exist,
mor that they are well-behaved, nor that any perfectly rational optimization
takes place on the part of the individuals.8
Thus the question to be asked may be: Can economic conservation laws of
either the Walrasian or the Samuelsonian form be, well, conserved? It should
be noted that general equilibrium theory continues to be the only integrated
approach that allows to conveniently grasp the economy as a whole and assess
the interdependence and interaction of different sectors and levels of aggregation.
The price paid for this is the simplification necessary for the assumptions of
the theory - conservation laws are an integral part of it. The problems of their
interpretation are evidenced by the worrying omission of the subject throughout
much of the history of general equilibrium theory in economics as discussed by
Mirowski (1989) and others (De Marchi, 1993). The careless application of
conclusions drawn from economic conservation laws to economic reality should
probably be avoided.
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